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ORIGINS OF ARMED SEPARATISM IN SOUTHERN SENEGAL1
The end of the Cold War rivalry between the world’s two superpowers
undoubtedly contributed greatly to the extinction of a number of armed con-
flicts in Africa. On the other hand, in the 1990s the continent went through
many new bloody wars of a complex origin. The participants in these dramatic
events were  usually fighting to control the entirety of a country or for control
of its natural resources. However, the power distribution changes that took place
in the world fifteen years ago were hardly of any significance in terms of the
increase or decrease of separatist tensions in Africa south of the Sahara.
In the history of statehood, separatism is a natural phenomenon rather than
something unusual. Separatism is mostly perceived as a group’s seeking to sepa-
rate one part of the territory of a given country from the rest in order to create a
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1 This study is the result of the author’s four visits to Senegal as well as of research
based on literature and press sources and of interviews conducted with Senegalese citi-
zens of different ethnic backgrounds  The author wishes to express his gratitude to
everyone who helped him to gather research material and with whom he could discuss
the issue of the conflict in Casamance, especially to Dr NFamara Lou Sambou (from
Ziguinchor), Dr Mamadou Diouf (from the Saloum region) and Cheik Amadou Dioum
(from Thiès). The author is also grateful for the opinions and discussions on research
methodology, terminology, and issues in question to Professor J.J. Milewski and Dr
M. Solarz from the Institute of Developing Countries at Warsaw University, Dr
M. Skotnicki from the Institute of Social, Economic and Regional Geography at the
Warsaw University, Dr M. Szupejko from the Centre for Studies on Non-European
Countries of the Polish Academy of Sciences and to Dr W. Lizak from the Institute of
International Relations at Warsaw University. The author is solely responsible for the
contents of this study, and opinions and theses included in it do not always correspond
to the views of his interlocutors. 
new state organism (secessionism) or to unify within one country lands inhabited
by people that form a single ethno-cultural community (irredentism). The idea of
separatism serves sometimes as a negotiating strategy for a regional group to get
from the state authorities benefits that are minor in comparison to territorial sep-
aration, e.g., the governance of a regional community within the framework of
territorial autonomy, or better conditions for a region’s integration with the rest
of the country. It is often the case, especially during a long-lasting intensification
of a regional conflict, that separatism becomes the ideological legitimisation for
the outbreak and continuance of an armed conflict, while the conflict itself turns
into a way of life for at least some of its initiators and participants.
Postcolonial Africa has been, and will be, experiencing conflicts of a sepa-
ratist nature. The most famous secession attempts in Africa include the case of
Katanga (1960-63) and Biafra (1967-1970). The war in Eritrea (1961-1991) is,
so far, the only African separatist conflict which has led to the establishment of
a new country (1993). The two bloody conflicts in Southern Sudan (1961-1972
and 1983-2005) are also of a separatist nature. Since 1975 till today, Ethiopia
has been grappling with armed separatism in Ogaden. The irredentist idea of
building a Greater Somalia, i.e., of uniting all the Somali people within one
country, was the underlying cause of the war that Ethiopia and Somalia fought
over Ogaden in 1977-1978.  In 1981, a conflict broke out in a northern part of
Somalia, which in 1991 had declared its independence as Somaliland. Although
the country has not been recognized as a country by the international commu-
nity, Somaliland possesses all the other attributes of a state, in contrast to the
Republic of Somalia, which has been in decline for many years.  These are only
some – often already past – examples of armed separatism on the African con-
tinent – the most bloody or long-lasting.
Armed separatism, however, is currently present in many other places in
Africa. Almost every country south of the Sahara has the prerequisite conditions
for the growth of separatism. Almost all the borders in Africa were arbitrarily
laid out by the colonial powers as early as the nineteenth century. Most of these
borders divide entire ethnic groups into the nominal citizens of different state
organisms. On the other hand, it is often the case that the borders of a country
comprise many peoples of different ethnic backgrounds as well as of different
cultures and beliefs. The multi-ethnic character of a society and its cultural
diversity are not, in themselves, a cause for separatist aspirations but they do
provide an important basis for it. 
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Separatist conflicts are extremely often, if unjustly, seen in strictly ethnic
terms. However, both Somaliland and the Republic of Somalia are inhabited
mainly by the same people – the Somalis (though they are greatly divided
because of competition between various clans). Eritrea is inhabited by ethnic
groups that also live in Ethiopia (though their share in the population is differ-
ent in each country). The bulk of the inhabitants of the Comoros speaks the
same language and forms a single cultural community that came into being as
various races and peoples intermingled over the centuries, and yet one island of
the archipelago, namely Ndzuwani (Anjouan), functioned as an independent
quasi-state in the years 1997-2001. These examples favour the theory that holds
that separatist conflicts have at their heart numerous and diverse factors that are
not necessarily connected with ethno-cultural otherness. 
One example of separatism in Africa that is extremely complex and inter-
esting to the researcher in such problems is the conflict that has taken place
since 1983 in the Senegalese region of Casamance2, situated on the river of the
same name. Its direct and indirect results include 3,000 to 5,000 fatalities3, tens
of thousands of refugees4, the destruction or closing of many schools and med-
ical care facilities, thousands of anti-tank mines, the worsening underdevelop-
ment of the south of Senegal, and the outbreak of a civil war in neighbouring
Guinea Bissau. These facts seem amazing since Senegal is one of the few
African countries that has remained politically stable since achieving independ-
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2 The Casamance region (within the borders of two administrative regions:
Ziguinchor and Kolda) is a little more than 28 thousand square kilometres in area
(according to Grand Larousse Universel, vol. III, Paris 1987, p. 1838), while the whole
Senegal – almost 197 thousand square kilometres in area. The Casamance region con-
stitutes about 14% of the Senegal’s surface. Main urban centres of Casamance are
Ziguinchor with 156 thousand inhabitants in 2003 and Kolda with about 55 thousand
inhabitants in 2003 (in both cases the approximate data come from Senegal – City
Population – Cities, Towns and Provinces – Statistics and Maps, http://www.citypopu-
lation.de/Senegal.html). 
3M. Humph r e y s , H. ag Moh amed , Senegal and Mali, Working Paper, United
Nations Studies at Yale/World Bank Workshop, Case Studies on the Economics and
Politics of Civil War, January 2003. (http://www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/
sen_mali.pdf), p. 4; M. Doy l e , Senegal’s southern rebellion starts to end, BBC News
World Edition, December 16, 2004 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4102267.stm). 
4 See Casamance Looks Forward to More Prosperous 2005 After Peace Deal, UN
Integrated Regional Information Networks (Dakar), December 31, 2004 and Senegal:
Time to Support Returns of the Displaced in Casamance, January 8, 2004
(http://www.refintl.org/content/article/detail/930).  
ence and that has never been governed by a military junta. Moreover, for years
Senegal has been considered a country that is introducing a democratic system
of government in a way that could serve as an example for many countries of
the African continent, where processes of democratisation seem to be rather
ostensible than real. 
Issues of separatism in southern Senegal are particularly topical in these
days, since at the end of 2004, separatists from Casamance and representatives
of the government in Dakar signed a preliminary peace treaty that is meant to
put an end to 20 years of military operations. Unlike the numerous previous
agreements imposing a suspension of military operations, the present agreement
is estimated by press commentators of the African political scene to have
brought an actual end to the armed conflict. Still, a scholar of Africa’s political
post-colonial history has to keep in mind that a cease-fire in itself does not solve
the problems that lay at the heart of the conflict, but merely creates an opportu-
nity to work out a political modus vivendi that could result in finding lasting
bases for the future peaceful coexistence of the parties to the conflict. The
example of Sudan is a case in point.
In every case, the establishment of a regional anti-government movement
and the use of the idea of separatism by its leaders is connected with the exis-
tence of specific conditions. Undoubtedly, the definite otherness of the majori-
ty of Casamance’s inhabitants in comparison with the ethnic group predominant
in Northern Senegal could not remain without influence on the emergence of the
conflict. Nevertheless, for more than twenty years after gaining independence,
the ethno-culturally diverse population of Senegal lived peacefully within the
borders of one state. This study is based on the premise that the outbreak of the
armed conflict took place in the context of a number of different factors and will
aim at sorting those at its genesis and at showing their complexity. The initial
part of the study presents an outline of the course of the conflict, while empha-
sising the significance of the humiliations and persecutions endured by mem-
bers of a regional anti-government group and the formation by this group of an
armed faction. This latter became the political instrument for initiating the con-
flict and provided the impulse that turned it into an armed one and led to its vio-
lent evolution. Subsequently, this study will analyse the factors favouring and
affecting armed separatism in Casamance according to their nature and will
divide them into historical, ethno-cultural, geographic, environmental, social,
economic, and political factors. In its last part, the study will attempt to conduct
an axiological classification of the factors and to arrange them in keeping with
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their degree of significance for the outbreak and evolution of the conflict in
Casamance. 
AN OUTLINE OF THE CONFLICT AND FACTORS DETERMINING ITS OUTBREAK
AND EVOLUTION
As early as in the colonial period, in 1947, school teachers in Casamance –
Émile Badiane and Ibou Diallo – founded a regional organisation called The
Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC, Mouvement des
Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance), whose main aim was supposed to be
the defence of the interests of the inhabitants of South Senegal, still a French
colony. The movement enjoyed popularity mainly among the Diola and
Malinke people, in the towns of Ziguinchor and Sédhiou, and in the surround-
ing territories. Before Senegal gained its independence, in 1960, the MFDC had
been absorbed by the countrywide Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais (BDS)5,
directed by Léopold Sédar Senghor, who was later to become the legendary first
president of Senegal. Reportedly, Senghor promised the leaders of the MFDC
that he would consider granting Casamance a special status (or even separate
statehood) within twenty years of Senegal gaining its independence. A part of
the region’s population thinks that Senghor and Badiane even made written
arrangements concerning the possibility of changing the future status of
Casamance. Moreover, it is believed that Badiane, who died in 1972, was de
facto murdered on the orders of the authorities in Dakar and copies of the writ-
ten agreement were destroyed.   
Since 1967, the Catholic parish priest of the cathedral in Ziguinchor,
Augustin Diamacouné Senghor, had programmes on a local radio in which he
called upon Casamance’s inhabitants to cultivate their regional identity. In
1978, this charismatic priest of Diola background published a booklet in which
he enumerated the various injustices suffered by the inhabitants of Casamance
at the hands of the Senegalese authorities. Among the population of the region
there arose an awareness of its otherness in relation to the rest of the Senegalese
population. Meanwhile, in 1981, Abdou Diouf was elected president of the
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5At that time Assane Seck, Louis Dacousta and Djibri Sarr created The Movement
for Autonomy of Casamance (Mouvement Autonomie de la Casamance), later also
included in BDS. 
country and ruled out any possibility of changing the status of the southern part
of the country. In 1982, Father Diamacouné re-established the MFDC. Of the
members of the organisation, made up of various ethnic groups, most were
Diola. The movement was joined by Christians, Muslims and followers of tra-
ditional religions. As its principal goal, the re-established organisation strived to
defend the region against so-called Wolofisation (the formation of a Senegalese
culture based on that of the country’s prevailing ethnic group, namely the
Wolof) by way of nurturing the cultural otherness of the Casamance population,
improving the living conditions of the region’s inhabitants and – in the long
term perspective – separating Casamance from Senegal and forming a new
independent state. The last postulate was, according to Father Diamacouné, to
be legitimated by the fact that, from a formal point of view, French colonisers
considered Casamance to be a separate colony, and the fact that the region had
not been granted independence should simply be regarded as an oversight. 
The factor that determined the outbreak of the armed conflict in
Casamance was the humiliation and persecution of MFDC members, while
the factor that determined the evolution of the conflict into armed sepa-
ratism was the formation of MFDC armed units. The MFDC, originally
resorting to solely peaceful measures, started demanding from the authorities in
Dakar that they put a stop to the migration of people from the north to the south
of Senegal and that they grant the Casamance elites real influence over the
region’s administration. In December 1982, a peaceful demonstration of MFDC
members and supporters in Ziguinchor, during which Senegalese flags were
burnt, was the occasion for brutalities by the police and security forces, the con-
flict’s first fatalities, and numerous arrests. The authorities made a mistake by
refusing to listen to the arguments of the local population. Many MFDC mem-
bers fled in fear of repression to the local woods, which are considered sacred,
where they underwent basic military training. In pursuit of the fugitives, the
Senegalese forces ventured deep into the woods, a move that was universally
viewed as a profanation of the sanctity of this place. Father Diamacouné was
among the detainees. Persecutions and arrests of separatists in 1983 confirmed
the MFDC leaders’ belief that the change of the status quo could not be
achieved by peaceful negotiations with the government. The disregard and
humiliations endured enhanced the frustration of MFDC activists and spurred
them to take up military action. From the peaceful movement that it had been
upon its re-establishment, the MFDC embarked on a course of violence as a
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response to the brutal actions of the government forces6. The wave of riots in
the region and the initial clashes in December 1983 between the state armed
forces and armed units of the MFDC7, which had almost immediately been
formed in the woods, brought numerous fatalities. 
The armed confrontation in Casamance that started in December 1983 was
concentrated around the city of Ziguinchor, on the Atlantic coast between the
borders with the Gambia and Guinea Bissau, and, occasionally, in the adminis-
trative region of Kolda. The fighting of MFDC members with state forces were
of an irregular nature. Separatists used mainly guerrilla tactics, organising
attacks on roads leading to Ziguinchor. More serious attacks on military bar-
racks, local police stations, the airport in Ziguinchor (e.g. a rocket attack in
1993), buildings of administrative authorities, and tourists8 were not a rarity.
The Senegalese army responded sometimes with the use of tanks and planes
against the separatists. Such periods of exacerbated fighting interspersed with
suspensions of military operations ended with several dozens of fatalities and
hundreds or thousands of refugees who sought shelter in neighbouring Gambia
or Guinea Bissau or who became internal refugees9. The world press devoted a
lot of attention to the conflict in Casamance, particularly after April 1995, when
four French tourists disappeared in the region (they have yet to be found).
Meanwhile, international human rights organizations repeatedly raised the issue
of the conflict’s civilian victims. For the state forces from time to time launched
brutal pacification operations in the region of Casamance, in particular in Lower
Casamance10, where on-the-spot executions and the razing of entire villages
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6 Cf. M. E v a n s , Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la
Casamance (MFDC), Africa Programme: Armed Non-State Actors Project AFP BP
04/02, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, December 2004, p. 17. 
7 It is believed that formally the armed faction of MFDC called Attika (i.e. warrior)
was established in 1985. See M. H a l l , The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999, Research
& Analytical Papers, African Research Group, Foreign & Commonwealth Office,
London, August 1999. 
8 See e.g. Tourist buses attacked, The Birmingham Post, February 22, 2000. 
9 See e.g. Global Appeal 2003. Strategies and Programmes, A. Encontre et al.
(eds.), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva 2003, p. 126; V.
Zeitlin, Refugee Voices from the Casamance Region of Senegal: Reunited, January 14,
2004 (http://www.refugeesinternational.org/content/article/detail/1246).  
10 In academic literature on the subject one can come across different divisions of
Casamance. For the purpose of this study the author adopts the following division:
Lower Casamance (Basse Casamance), situated south of the Casamance River and west
took place when the inhabitants were suspected of supporting the separatists.
The Senegalese forces often practiced various sophisticated torture methods on
the civilians (such as hanging women and the elderly on trees in the sun during
the hottest time of the day). They often destroyed local crops as well.
Sometimes, the MFDC fighters also treated civilians – especially immigrants
from the Northern Senegal – with cruelty, for example, shooting people caught
in an ambush on a road or sacrificing them later in the sacred woods.11 MFDC
fighters were often involved in violent crime, including the raiding of shops and
burglaries. Separatists obtained financing for their military operations mainly
from selling hashish (obtained from Indian hemp cultivated in the region)12,
cashew, and rare kinds of timber13, as well as from robberies and donations
from Casamance emigrés, living mainly in France, the United States, and
Switzerland. The largest concentrations of rebels were active near the border
with Guinea Bissau. MFDC fighters used rifles, sub-machine guns, and
revolvers, as well as grenade launchers and various types of explosives. They
laid thousands of mines in many parts of the region14. The number of armed
separatists differed from year to year and, according to various estimations, it
fluctuated between two and four thousand15, while the state forces of Senegal
had 4 to 5 thousand soldiers in the region16. The fact that some of the
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of the Ziguinchor town, Northern Casamance (Casamance Nord), situated north of the
Casamance River and spread up to the border with Gambia, Upper Casamance (Haute
Casamance), situated east of Ziguinchor in the upper reaches of the Casamance River
and spread de facto till the Senegalese stretch of the Gambia River.   
11 See e.g. Senegal: Climate of Terror in Casamance, Amnesty International
Report, 1998. 
12 Drug sales could constitute in some periods of the conflict up to 70% of MFDC
income (M. H a l l , The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999, op. cit.).
13 For more information see M. Evans, Senegal: Mouvement des Forces
Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), op. cit., pp. 2 and 10-11. 
14 For more information see Casamance Looks Forward to More Prosperous 2005
after Peace Deal, op. cit.
15 M. Ev a n s , Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance
(MFDC), op. cit., p. 6. In the second part of the 1990s MFDC accepted mercenaries
from Liberia and Sierra Leone. See idem pp. 7-8.
16 Le Sénégal et la rébellion indépendantiste de Casamance, Questions interna-
tionales 5, janvier-février 2004, p. 38 and P. Englebert, Should I Stay or Should I Go?
Compliance and Defiance to National Integration in Barotseland and Casamance,
Paper prepared for the 19th biannual conference of the Vereinigung von Afrikanisten in
Deutschland e. V. (VAD), Hannover, 2-5 June 2004, p. 9. The Senegalese armed forces
are cyclically prepared to combat readiness by Frenchmen. Moreover, in 1997 Senegal
Senegalese army officers who were stationed in Casamance derived material
benefit from their control of the trade in rare timber in the region might prove a
significant factor explaining protracted nature of the conflict17. 
What influenced the low intensity of military operations in Casamance was
the lack of either the willingness or the possibility of adopting resolute and
forceful methods by the government party. The Senegalese authorities used the
carrot and stick approach towards inhabitants of the south. In the 1980s and
1990s the presence of government forces and security services personnel was
significantly increased in the rebellious region. In addition to harassing
Casamance civilians, they jailed, tortured, and killed MFDC fighters, tortured,
(some of them are said to have been thrown into the sea while being transport-
ed to Dakar). At the same time, Senegalese authorities took measures to spur the
development of Casamance (among other things, they developed the road infra-
structure of the region), conducted negotiations, and signed ceasefire agree-
ments with MFDC on several occasions, amnestied its members and treated
father Diamacouné with considerable indulgence. Many local politicians who
dissociated themselves from MFDC activities were provided with work in the
administration of the region or even posts in the central government. The
authorities in Dakar were not interested in either escalating or publicising the
conflict, mainly on account of the hopes they pinned on the development of
tourism, especially in the face of competition from Gambia and the Republic of
Cape Verde in this respect18. Consequently, the conflict in Casamance in com-
parison to many other African conflicts never turned into a full fledged war, an
eventuality that would have resulted in a heavy death toll.
In reality, there always were severe splits within the ranks of the MFDC,
having to do with power struggles and differences of opinion on the aims of the
conflict, on combat tactics and on the further legitimacy of the conflict. On the
177
Origins of Armed Separatism in Southern Senegal
was included in the programme The US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)
whose aim is to improve military capacity of Senegalese soldiers and to prepare them
better for peace operations. For more information see Strategic Survey 1998-1999,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, London 1999, p. 281.
17M. Humph r e y s , H. ag Moh amed , Senegal and Mali, op. cit., p. 14, [after:]
M. Evans, The Political Economy of War in the Casamance, Working Paper, SOAS,
London 2002. 
18 Tourism and other relevant branches of economy for years brought revenues to
the Budget of Senegal. For more information see West African Tourist Trends, Africa
Insight, Vol. 27, No 2, 1997, pp. 147-148.
one hand, the lack of unity among members of the organisation led to apathy
within its ranks and to the ineffectiveness of its actions, but on the other hand,
it brought about a situation in which for a long time the authorities in Dakar
lacked a partner for peace talks. Till this day, some of the MFDC members are
not interested in a peaceful solution. The main factions of the MFDC include
the Northern Front (Front Nord) from Northern Casamance that since 1991 has
been avoiding forceful action and has even signed a ceasefire with the govern-
ment in Dakar on behalf of the entire MFDC, and the Southern Front (Front
Sud) from Lower Casamance that has for many years been most decidedly in
favour of continuing military operations. In 2003 the leaders of the MFDC offi-
cially backed out of a demand for independence for Casamance and embarked
on peace negotiations with the government. 
HISTORICAL FACTORS
Lack of tradition of a common state organism in the region of
Casamance and Northern Senegal and lack of a developed political organi-
sation among most of the inhabitants of the South. Senegal within its present
borders is a territorial unit established by the French colonial authorities.
Casamance and Northern Senegal never constituted a common state organism
but, at the same time, there never existed a single separate country where
Southern Senegal is situated today. The Wolof people which constitute the
majority of today population in Northern Senegal did not have extensive contacts
with the Diola people who predominate in the lower reaches of Casamance. 
In the history of Northern Senegal there was a number of strong and well-
organised ethnic states, including, among others, countries of the Wolof (Djolof,
Cayor, Walo, Baol) established in the 15th century. State traditions of peoples
living north of the river Gambia were much more developed than in the case of
peoples inhabiting the so-called Upper Guinea, i.e. the area situated between the
river Casamance and Sierra Leone. M. Tymowski points out, the history of
small states and peoples of this part of Africa is poorly researched on account
of a lack of written sources and of unfamiliarity with local oral traditions19.
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19 M. Tymowsk i , Wybrzeøe Górnej i Dolnej Gwinei do XVI w. (The Coast of
Upper and Lower Guinea until 16th Century), [in:] Historia Afryki do poczpitku XIX
wieku (The History of Africa until the Beginning of 19th Century), M. Tymowski (ed.),
Wroc≥aw-Warszawa-Kraków 1996, p. 590. 
However, it is a well-known fact that when the Portuguese arrived in West
Africa, different stateless communities and small local organisations20, politi-
cally dominated by peoples from the Mande group, inhabited the river basin of
Casamance. They had most probably been under the political influence of the
Mali state until 13th century21.
Alvise Ca’Da Mosto – an Italian sailor in the service of Henry the
Navigator, the Portuguese infante – who came to Casamance in 1456 is said to
have learned from local people that the name of the river upon which they lived
was derived from a combination of words manza (ruler) and his name – Casa
(Kaza)22. Unlike in Senegambia, Islam was not predominant in this area, as
trade with Muslim merchants only developed here quite late23. In the period of
expansion of Portuguese influence, especially in the 16th century, the area south
of Gambia was one of the main regions of the slave trade. The Portuguese did
not, however, establish fortified centres in the river basin of Casamance, and
they carried on their activities mainly from their base on the Cape Verde Islands.
The Portuguese and rulers of the Mali Empire maintained mutually advanta-
geous trade relations. The Atlantic coast and the Casamance basin were settled
by the Afro-Portuguese (tango maos, lançados)24, who were active in local
trade, among others areas. Creole culture started developing in some places of
the region. 
In the local oral tradition, the coastal province of Mali is called Gabu
(Kabu)25. At the end of the 16th century, as Mali was disintegrating, Gabu won
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20 P. Cu r t i n , Wybrzeøe Afryki Zachodniej w dobie handlu niewolnikami (The West
African Coast in the Era of Slave Trade), [in:] P. Cu r t i n , S. F e i e rman , L.
Thompson , J. Van s i n a , Historia Afryki (The History of Africa), GdaÒsk 2003, p. 276. 
21 M. Tymowsk i , Sudan Zachodni od VII do XVI w. (Western Sudan from 7th
to 16th Century), [in:] Historia Afryki do poczpitku XIX wieku, op. cit., p. 484.
22 J. S t a s z ew s k i , Ma≥y s≥ownik. Pochodzenie i znaczenie nazw geograficznych
(A Small Dictionary. Origin and Meaning of Geographic Names), Wiedza Powszechna,
Warszawa 1968, p. 89. Casamance belongs to one of the first names of African rivers
that the Portuguese brought to Europe and which are used until the present day.
23 P. C u r t i n , Handel i ruchy religijne w Afryce Zachodniej (Trade and Religious
Movements in West Africa), [in:] P. C u r t i n , S. F e i e rman , L. T h omp s o n , J.
Va n s i n a , Historia Afryki, op. cit., p. 468. 
24 B. Nowak , Poczpitki obecnoúci europejskiej w Afryce Czarnej (Beginnings of
European Presence in Black Africa), [in:] Historia Afryki do poczpitku XIX wieku, op.
cit., pp. 781 and 784.
25 M. Tymowsk i , Sudan Zachodni od VII do XVI w., op. cit., p. 463. 
independence and either split into a few smaller states or became a separate
country which was divided by Fulani warriors not earlier than in the 19th cen-
tury26.
In the 19th century, there existed several smaller states in the
Casamance basin which were founded by the Mande and Fulani people. Most
probably, the Diola people neither had their own proto-state nor constituted
greater state organisms. The absolute power of their rulers (oeji) – who were, at
the same time, local priests – extended only over small communities separated
by forests or a river and which included up to a few villages27. Lack of devel-
oped forms of political organisation was a common feature among most small
ethnic groups which inhabited the coast of Upper Guinea28. The village was
their basic organisational unit and blood ties were essential.  
During the period of colonial rivalry between Europeans in Africa in the
19th century, the Casamance area was under French control as a result of the
negotiation of several agreements by Paris and Lisbon in the years 1850-186529.
In the end, France obtained formal rule over the region for, among other things,
granting the Portuguese the right to fish along the coasts of French territories in
Africa. However, only in 1886 did the French get the rights to Ziguinchor, the
centre of the Portuguese presence in the region.
The main occupation of Casamance inhabitants, most of whom were
Diola people, was at that time rice cultivation. Trade in the region was con-
trolled by Muslim and Lusophone-African traders. While in Northern Senegal
there existed a complex hierarchy of marabouts, in the Casamance region the
hierarchy system in the political sphere was poorly developed30. The leading
authorities in the life of the community acted above all in the spiritual sphere,
as intermediaries to sanctuaries in the holy woods, where men undergoing ini-
tiation made decisions on wars, land, and cultivation collectively. In the era of
colonialism and during the formation of the Senegalese state, features charac-
teristic for political life in Casamance –central leadership vaccum, lack of a
developed hierarchy, and decision-making egalitarianism – proved to be an
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26 Ibidem, p. 846.
27 Z. Komo r ow s k i , Senegal – kszta≥towanie siÍ jednoúci i niepodleg≥oúci
(Senegal – Unity and Independence Formation), Warszawa 1977, pp. 14-15.
28M. Tymowsk i , Wybrzeøe Górnej i Dolnej Gwinei do XVI w., op. cit., p. 590. 
29 M. Ha l l , The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999, op. cit.
30 P. E n g l e b e r t , Should I Stay or Should I Go? Compliance and Defiance to
National Integration in Barotseland and Casamance, op. cit., p. 15.
important factor explaining the lack of a clear articulation of the need for the
existence of separate statehood in the Casamance region. 
Late colonisation of Casamance and controversies over the formal
status of the region during French rule. The first French trading posts in
Senegal north of Gambia began to spring up in 1639. In 1836 the French estab-
lished their first foothold in Casamance on the Carabane Island.31 In 1854 the
French started colonising the Senegalese interior and, although in 1860 they
managed to occupy some lands in the Casamance basin, they did not subdue the
little state of Fuladu upon the upper reaches of Casamance until 1903.32 It is
usually assumed that the colonial conquest of Senegal was finished in the years
1891-1895.33 Thus, the colonial conquest of the whole of Casamance took place
relatively late.    
From the perspective of administrative management, the French treated
Casamance in a special way. In the colonial period, the area of Casamance was
not a separate protectorate but was administrated separately from the rest of
Senegal as the Territoire de la Casamance until 1939. It remained under the
direct authority of the governor of the French West Africa. The region enjoyed
far-reaching autonomy which was probably connected with its difficult accessi-
bility and its significant distance from the administrative centre in Dakar.34 D.
Darbon35 argues that, originally, Casamance was considered by the French as a
“trade area” which was not to be included in Senegal. 
Casamance was administratively integrated with the rest of French
Senegal only for the last two decades of the colonial period, in the 1940s and
1950s.36 After Senegal gained independence in 1960, Casamance became a
component of a new state. Such a short period of Casamance’s integrity with
other regions of Senegal as one administrative organism could have led to the
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31 F. B r i g a u d , Histoire du Sénégal (History of Senegal), Dakar 1964, p. 44.
32 Ibidem.
33 Z. Komo r ow s k i , Senegal – kszta≥towanie siÍ jednoúci i niepodleg≥oúci, op.
cit., p. 51.
34 M. Ha l l , The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999, op. cit.
35 D. D a r b o n , L’Administration et le Paysan en Casamance essai d’anthropolo-
gie administrative, Paris 1987, [after:] M. Humphreys, H. ag Mohamed, Senegal and
Mali, op. cit., p. 37. 
36 P. E n g l e b e r t , Should I Stay or Should I Go? Compliance and Defiance to
National Integration in Barotseland and Casamance, op. cit., p. 3.
smaller degree of political, social, cultural37 and economic integration of the
southern region with the rest of the country.38 The region’s elites still invoke the
distinct colonial history of Casamance. For many years, separatist leaders even
maintained that uncompleted decolonisation processes constitute a legitimisa-
tion for their fight for independence. MFDC leaders entrusted French historian
Jacques Charpy with investigating this issue based on available data. This
expert evaluation from 1994 – based on the study of documents and writings of
the colonial era – did not find any evidence which could indicate that
Casamance had ever enjoyed any formal autonomy within French West
Africa.39 Thus, research did not confirm that when Senegal was being
decolonised the region had any right to independence on the account of a sepa-
rate colonial heritage.
The Casamance residents’ experience of military action. The region
of Casamance was the last part of Senegal to fall under French rule and had a
very rebellious history in the colonial period. Given the extraordinary mobilisa-
tion of local people against the colonisers, the Diola people’s tradition of resist-
ance was compared by one of the author’s Senegalese interlocutors with upris-
ings known from Polish history of the Partition period. Inhabitants of the region
still cherish the memory of numerous heroes of he struggle against the French.
Alinisitowe Diatte, who was deported by the French in 1943 to a different part
of West Africa (probably Timbuktu) from which she never returned, remains,
among other figures, such a symbol of resistance to colonizers.40 In the 1960s
and 1970s, the bravery of the Diola people was put to the test during the war of
liberation in neighbouring Portuguese Guinea.41 Casamance residents not only
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37 V. F o u c h e r (Les ‘évolués’, la migration, l’école: pour une nouvelle intérpre-
tation de la naissance du nationalisme casamançais, [in:] M.C. Diop, Le Sénégal
Contemporain, Paris 2002, [after:] M. Humph r e y s , H. ag Moh amed , Senegal and
Mali, op. cit., p. 37) indicates that the Senegalese authorities used cultural otherness (or
even exoticism) of Casamance for development of foreign tourism in the region. It
could paradoxically lead to enhancing sense of regional separateness.   
38 Cf. an opposite case of Majotta in K. Tr z c iÒ s k i , L’anatomie de la désagréga-
tion de l’État – le cas des Comores, Africana Bulletin 52, 2004, pp. 134-135.
39 For more information see J. C h a r p y, Historical Testimony on Casamance,
Dakar 1994. 
40 L. H a r tman , Indigenous Rebellion in the Casamance Province of Senegal,
Fourth World Bulletin, December 1993, Vol. 3, No. 1. 
41 For more information see M. Evans, Senegal: Mouvement des Forces
Démocratiques de la Casmanace (MFDC), op. cit., p. 14.
actively supported their fellow neighbours who, as a part of the PAIGC42,
fought with Portuguese soldiers, a member of NATO, but also gained combat
experience which later proved useful during the separatist conflict with
Senegalese troops. The fact that the peoples in Guinea Bissau had forced, part-
ly by military force, the Portuguese to leave continental West Africa was cer-
tainly inspiring for supporters of the idea of separating Casamance from
Senegal by military action. Moreover, the fact that some of the MFDC military
leaders had fought in the ranks of the French army in Indo-China and Algeria
also proved significant in this respect. 
THE ETHNO-CULTURAL FACTOR
Multidimensional ethno-cultural otherness of the Diola and Wolof peo-
ple. Senegal is inhabited by about 10.3 million people.43 It is estimated that the
entire region of Casamance has 1.3 million residents.44 The population of
Senegal consists of a dozen or so ethno-cultural groups which differ significant-
ly. In the north of Senegal, the Wolof people (who constitute 44% of the coun-
try’s inhabitants45) are the most numerous group. The bulk of the population of
Casamance, considerably over 60%46, is made up of the Diola47 (who consti-
tute around 5% of the whole population of Senegal) and their fellow peoples
(the Manjak, Balante, Flup, and Bainuk). Other peoples inhabiting Southern
Senegal are the Malinke (from the Mande group), the Fulani, the Wolof, and the
Lebu people, in addition to the Mancagne, Serer and Toucouleur.
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42 Partido Africano de Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for
Guinea and Cape Verde Independence). 
43 An estimate by UNFPA from 2003 (Senegal: Statistics & Indicators, United
Nations Population Fund, New York 2005, Part 1. Population). 
44 The estimated data from 2003 for the administrative regions of Ziguinchor and
Kolda according to Senegal – City Population – Cities, Towns and Provinces – Statistics
and Maps, op. cit.
45 Afryka. Popularna Encyklopedia Powszechna (Africa. Popular Universal
Encyclopaedia), R. Myd e l and J. G r o c h (eds.), Warszawa 2000, p. 321. Northern
and Eastern Senegal is inhabited apart from Wolof people by inter alia the Serer (around
15% of the whole of the country’s population), the Toucouleur (around 11%) and the
Soninke (around 9%).
46 M. Ha l l , The Casamance Conflict 1982-1999, op. cit.
47 See C.G. S e l i gman , Ludy Afryki (Peoples of Africa), Warszawa 1972, pp. 65-66. 
From the perspective of the division of the Casamance region adopted in
this study the Diola constitute a majority in Lower Casamance and Northern
Casamance. The Fulani and the Malinke predominate in Upper Casamance. The
Diola have lived at peace with the other peoples inhabiting Casamance for ages.
They regard the Wolof and culturally akin Lebu peoples, who migrate to
Casamance from the northern part of Senegal, as their main antagonists. The
attitude of the Diola to newcomers is perfectly illustrated by one of their say-
ings: “everyone who is at home feels like a hippopotamus in water”48. This say-
ing could be explained as a lack of acceptance for the culturally different peo-
ples who occupy lands in the region that have traditionally been inhabited by
the Diola.49 The Diola and the Wolof differ from each other in numerous fea-
tures of their cultural and mental being. Mixed marriages between the Diola and
the Wolof are very rare in Senegal, while marriages of the Wolof with members
of other peoples are quite common.
The ethnic Diola group constitutes a mosaic of forest people who have been
quite isolated from the external world for ages. Fundamental criteria of social
prestige among the Diola include great attention to following tradition and cus-
toms50. Many Diola people are members of various secret or open associations.
Local rulers and councils of elders continue to have significant influence on the
inhabitants of many villages. The Diola are not divided into castes, which
explains in part why they lack a well established social hierarchy and political
organisation and figures of authority that would be universal for the whole
region. 
In comparison to the Diola, the Wolof are a people of the savannah zone,
where contacts with other peoples have been frequent and often of the nature of
an invasion. As a consequence of numerous wars, the existence of a long-last-
ing and strong state power, and the division of labour imposed by the state, the
Wolof are distinguished by an established caste system51 in which power and
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48 Z. Komo r ow s k i , Senegal – kszta≥towanie siÍ jednoúci i niepodleg≥oúci, op.
cit., pp. 39-40.
49 Mamadou Diouf, the author’s interlocutor, explains the meaning of this saying
in the context of antagonisms existing between the indigenous Diola and the incoming
Wolof as follows: “AWolof will never become like a Diola and he will never be accept-
ed by the Diola”.  
50 Z. Komo r ow s k i , Senegal – kszta≥towanie siÍ jednoúci i niepodleg≥oúci, op.
cit., pp. 24 and 39.
51 Ibidem, p. 25.
religion are interwoven. The political influence of the marabouts, their spiritual
leaders, has played a leading role in filling the main state posts in Senegal until
now. Even in the era where a democratic system of governance is being formed,
the marabouts still shape election preferences for a significant part of the Wolof.
Much more than 90% of all of Senegal’s population are Muslims.
Meanwhile, quite a number of the Diola, especially those living near the
Atlantic coast, are Catholics. The Diola and their fellow peoples have been sub-
jected to the process of Christianisation since the 15th century by Portuguese
missionaries. Yet a part of the Diola are exclusively followers of traditional
beliefs, while a part are Muslims. Meanwhile, almost all of the Wolof people
inhabiting Senegal profess an allegiance to Islam. The Muslim religion is
expanding rapidly among followers of traditional beliefs. 
In Casamance, both Christianity and Islam have a syncretic character, since
they include a number of elements of traditional belief, such as worshipping the
‘sacred forests’ (bois sacrés) in which ceremonial initiations are practiced.
These initiations are still of great significance in the world of men, as they con-
stitute a true school of life. They also aim at, among other, the fraternization of
men from one or several neighbouring villages, the instilling and strengthening
of loyalty towards people of one’s own kind, and the preservation of ancient tra-
ditions52. 
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52 Elements characteristic of the traditional beliefs of the Diola are totems and
sacred places (often with altars) in which magic power is believed to remain. Sacred
woods play an extremely important role in the life of the Diola. It is believed that forests
are inhabited by ancestors who watch the living. In woods, various secret meetings (e.g.,
councils of war) and ceremonies take place. The most important are collective initiations
of men. Initiations are nowadays usually organised once every several dozen years. It
often happens that fathers go through initiation together with their sons. From time to
time, individual initiations may take place. At one time a man could not take a wife before
his initiation, but at the same time initiations took place more frequently. According to
the tradition of the Diola, every man should go through the whole process of initiation.
Only those men who have been through initiation or who are to go through that process
may enter the sacred woods. A part of the initiation ceremony is kept secret. It is, how-
ever, known that the initiation can take even up to a month. Men live the whole time in
the forest. Women prepare food and drinks that they bring to an agreed place at the edge
of the forest. During the process of initiation a woman cannot see any of the men. If she
does it could result, amongst other things, in her infertility. The traditional ruler of a com-
munity is the master of the ceremony. He is believed to have the largest amount of knowl-
edge. During initiation men receive their education about adult life, reprehensible acts,
loving people and doing good, respecting their neighbour, and the way women should be
The residents of Senegal speak many - often very different - languages. At
the same time the language of the Wolof is the real lingua franca of this multi-
ethnic country, even though it does not have a written form. It is used in private
life as well as in the administration, the media, and partly in the educational sys-
tem. For a significant part of the Senegalese who are not Wolof, the Wolof lan-
guage has already become their prime means of communication. Most of the
Diola know Wolof but they actively cultivate their own language. Even the
Diola inhabiting Dakar use exclusively the language of their ancestors when
they are at home. This tradition is sacred to the Diola. Many indigenous inhab-
itants of Casamance also speak a Creole language.
The Diola and the Wolof live different lives and have quite different men-
talities. Most of the Diola till the soil, cultivating rice especially53. Animal hus-
bandry has developed on a small scale. Very few are fishermen or hunters. The
Diola are extremely attached to their land, while the Wolof are a mobile people.
Moving and looking for better conditions are second-nature to the Wolof. Many
Wolof people are no longer emotionally attached to a particular land or a partic-
ular region. The Wolof do not cultivate rice. Some migrants are, nevertheless,
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treated. Initiation also serves to improve knowledge of the region’s history and the life
of Diola ancestors. During the initiation, the ceremonial burial of a community member
who has recently died takes place. Every evening at the fire they sing songs together. A
separate song is composed for every man – it talks about him, his family, and ancestors.
Its purpose is to boost the pride of, and strengthen the bonds between, the Diola. At the
end of the ceremony cattle offerings are consumed. Not before the initiation is over can
a man regard himself as an adult. A man who has not been through initiation is not
respected by his community in the way adults should be and is not allowed to make joint
decisions on issues that are important to the life of the community. Going through ini-
tiation is a matter of honour, arising both from the social pressure and internal need.
Initiation has a psychological effect: from now on a man knows what initiation consists
in, has access to all the secret matters of the community, and may participate in gather-
ings in the sacred woods. After initiation a man may wear a symbolic cap as a sign of
maturity. During the conflict in Casamance some separatists’ hideaways were situated
in sacred woods. The author is grateful to Nfamara Lou Sambou for outlining the sub-
ject of the contemporary role of woods and the process of initiation. For more informa-
tion on traditional rites of the Diola see R.M. B a um , Shrines of the Slave Trade: Diola
Religion and Society in Precolonial Senegambia, New York – Oxford 1999, and L.V.
Thoma s , Les Diolas, Dakar 1958, Vol. 1.
53 Rice cultivation has been a traditional occupation of the Diola in the Casaman-
ce basin for a dozen or so centuries. See S. S z a f r aÒ s k i , Wczesna epoka øelaza w
Afryce na po≥udnie od Sahary (The Early Iron Age in Africa South of Sahara), [in:]
Historia Afryki do poczpitku XIX wieku, op. cit., p. 323.
farmers who have come into possession of local land. The Wolof cultivate main-
ly peanuts or millet. Some Wolof people who settled in Southern Senegal are
civil servants, teachers, policemen, or soldiers.
The Diola are regarded by the Senegalese as honest and hospitable people.
They are not rich and they are not business oriented. As one interlocutor from
Northern Senegal describes them: “The Diola adhere to simplicity of life. They
have their rice fields, palms and palm-wine. Money is not the most important
thing for them.”54 A sense of solidarity and the attachment to their ancestors’
customs, including ancient beliefs connected with land, rice, and woods are of
the utmost importance for the Diola. The Wolof are regarded as cunning,
dynamic, and money-hungry people. The Diola irritate the Wolof mainly
because they allegedly treat the whole of Casamance as their own land,
although the region is inhabited by other peoples as well. Meanwhile the Diola,
proud of their ethno-cultural otherness, are afraid of the Wolof’s cultural and
quantitative domination. 
GEOGRAPHICALAND ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS
The unique shape of the region, its limited territorial contact with the
rest of Senegal, and its peripheral location relative to the political and eco-
nomic centre of the country55.  The area of Casamance is an oblong strip of
land, which as a result of arbitrary territorial divisions in the era of European
colonialism, became separated from Northern Senegal by the territory of
Gambia (once a British enclave cutting into the territory of French West
Africa)56. In the south, Casamance borders Guinea Bissau, to the west it has the
Atlantic Ocean, and only in the east does it neighbour with Tambacounda, a
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54 Cheik Amadou Dioum is the author of this opinion.
55 On the significance of these features for the success of separatist actions see K.
Tr z c iÒ s k i , The Significance of Geographic Location for the Success of Territorial
Secession. African Example, Miscellanea Geographica, Vol. 11, 2004, pp. 207-216.
56 In the years 1982-1989 Senegal and Gambia constituted a confederation named
Senegambia,  for political reasons, as well as, amongst other reasons, to harmonise trade
and transport between the two countries. Among the factors involved in the confedera-
tion’s collapse were misunderstandings between the presidents of Senegal and Gambia
in regards to divisions of power and the introduction of a single currency. 
Senegalese administrative region. In consequence, the land connection with
Senegal remains much slighter than that with Gambia or Guinea Bissau.
Moreover, the region of Casamance is situated at the very south of Senegal, far
from the capital city and other main urban centres. All these features cause
Casamance to be very isolated in terms of communications from the remainder
of the country, and this, in consequence, leads to the region’s low degree of eco-
nomic and social integration with the rest of Senegal.
The possession of borders with third countries and a peripheral location are
very important factors in the development of separatism57.  At various moments
of the conflict, MFDC fighters took advantage of foreign bases, shelters, and
channels for smuggling weapons and financial means. Casamance’s bordering
only a short stretch of another Senegalese region frequently facilitated
Casamance’s military actions and the movement of separatists, while at the
same time it hindered the mobility of the government forces.    
The limited land connection with the rest of Senegal affects the
Casamance population psychologically as well, as they treat every journey
overland or by ship to Dakar as travelling abroad. Inhabitants of Casamance
who are going to Dakar or other cities in the north even say that they are ‘going
to Senegal.’
The insignificant area of the countries neighbouring Casamance. Both
countries neighbouring Casamance are very small. Gambia has an area of
around 11.3 thousand square kilometres, which means that it is almost three
times smaller than the area of Casamance (more than 28 thousand square kilo-
metres). Guinea Bissau has a territory not much bigger than that of Casamance,
namely 36.1 thousand square kilometres, while the area of the smallest country
in Africa, i.e., the Republic of Cape Verde, is a little over 4 thousand square
kilometres. The examples of small but independent countries neighbouring with
Casamance inspire the separatists to regard it as natural to found another small
state organism in the region. 
Features of Casamance’s natural environment. Casamance has a dif-
ferent climate from the rest of Senegal, i.e., it has a humid subequatorial climate
which is distinguished by larger amounts of rainfall than in the northern part of
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57 Cf. M. Evans, Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance
(MFDC), op. cit., p. 2.
the country with its subequatorial dry climate58. The dry climate contributes in
the north (and in the north-east) to drought disasters and to progressing soil
desertification (Ferlo Desert is an example of this phenomenon) while on the
county-wide scale it results in intensified internal and external migrations, sig-
nificant urbanisation, and the emergence of considerable disproportions in the
spatial concentration of the population (the most densely populated areas
include the capital city and the lands around it, as well as the Atlantic coast)59.
The uniqueness of Casamance’s climate allows for more developed cultivation
than in the rest of Senegal, which is very tempting for migrants from the north.
Some features of Casamance’s natural environment provide favourable
conditions for the activity of separatists. The area situated along Casamance’s
Atlantic coast, north of the mouth of the Casamance River up to the city of
Diouloulou, near the border with Gambia, is boggy, marshy, and overgrown
with mangroves. The southern part of the river’s estuary, in the direction of the
border with Guinea Bissau, is distinguished by a labyrinth of small islands,
bays, and river branches. These lands, that can be traversed by pirogue, became
a convenient hiding place for MFDC fighters during the conflict. The thick
woods with which Casamance abounds also provided shelter. 
Important natural resources in Casamance. On Casamance’s shelf there
are deposits of natural gas and oil60. The exploitation of oil is to begin soon. In
comparison, the main natural resources of Northern Senegal are phosphorites
(an important export commodity, used for the production of artificial fertilizers)
and rock salt.
The perspective of possessing a raw material base may seem attractive to
separatists who aim at founding their own state in Casamance61. For the elites
of Northern Senegal, a region that abounds in natural resources has special
value and this may strengthen the resistance to its secession.  
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58 In the South rainfalls exceed 1500 mm during a year and the rain season lasts
from June to October. Rainfalls decrease even to around 350mm as one travels farther
to the North and the rain season lasts from July to September (Afryka. Popularna
Encyklopedia Powszechna, op. cit., p. 322).
59 For more information see M.C. D i o p , Senegal, [in:] Encyclopaedia of
Twentieth-Century African History, P.T. Z e l e z a and D. E y o h (eds.), London – New
York 2003, p. 481.
60 For more information see M. E v a n s , Senegal: Mouvement des Forces
Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), op. cit., p. 16.
61 Cf. M. Humph r e y s , H. ag Moh amed , Senegal and Mali, op. cit., p. 33. 
SOCIAL FACTORS
Problems and antagonisms stemming from migration from
Northern Senegal to Casamance. Since the 1970s migration of people from
other regions of Senegal to Casamance has been increasing. The people who
migrate to Casamance are mainly Wolof and Lebu people, who enjoy higher
financial standing than inhabitants of the South. Migrations of ethno-culturally
disparate people started to be regarded – especially at the beginning of the
1980s - by the inhabitants of Casamance as a serious threat to their cultural
identity and traditional existence. A part of Casmance’s elites suspects that an
influx of migrants from the northern part of Senegal is stimulated by the author-
ities in Dakar and that it aims at the future quantitative domination of the indige-
nous population by the immigrant one. 
As a consequence of the increased migration numerous antagonisms
arose in relations between the indigenous population and the newcomers from
the North. The Wolof often bought land from impoverished Diola people,
allegedly paying below the land’s real value, and developed the cultivation of
peanuts, which the native inhabitants of Southern Senegal associate mainly with
colonialism62. In Casamance the Diola in particular were repeatedly dispos-
sessed and their lands were allotted as settlement plots for migrants, grounds for
building tourist infrastructure, and planting orchards63. This was possible
thanks to the Land Nationalisation Act, which concerned lands that were not
formally in private hands (that is, were not utilized economically)64. Although
the legislation had been enacted in 1964 its resolutions were introduced in
Casamance no sooner than 1979. In order to graze cattle and cultivate peanuts,
a part of the immigrant people occupied grounds that for ages had been regard-
ed in the region as belonging to the Diola, even if they had not been adapted
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62 Peanuts were brought to the contemporary Senegal by the Portuguese and were
popularised by Frenchmen who managed to levy a tax on local people partly thanks to
their cultivation. 
63 There could be even six thousand of expropriation cases. For more information
see M. Humph r e y s , H. ag Moh amed , Senegal and Mali, op. cit., p. 43; M.
Ev a n s , Senegal: Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC),
op. cit., p. 3.
64 Loi sur le domaine Nationale, no. 6446, from June 17, 1964 (Journal Officiel
3690 from July 11, 1964, 905). 
economically. Some newcomers from the North cut down trees for firewood in
local woods considered by the Diola as sacred. Earth is of sacred significance
to the Diola, while for the Wolof - mostly of material importance. Newcomers
from North Senegal also dominated the  transport services and even minor trade
in many parts of Casamance65. There is a clear economical gulf between the
local and incoming people. 
The migration of members of a small people called the Lebu to
Casamance’s seaside lands is also a significant problem. The Lebu speak the
Wolof language, inhabit the region of Dakar and nearby Cape Verde, and earn
their living by fishing. They are traditional fishermen, fishing for sardines in
small pirogues. The Lebu migrate to Casamance for economic reasons. The
Atlantic coast in the region of the capital city has become less and less attrac-
tive because of the progressive over-exploitation of the fishing grounds. This is
due to the fact that fast modern trawlers, most of which belong to fishing fleets
of European Union countries, fish along the coast of Northern Senegal66.  The
government of Senegal has been selling fishing quotas on its territorial waters
to Europeans for years, but Senegalese fishermen do not directly benefit.
Fishing is diminishing as the quantity of fish available in the immediate vicini-
ty of the coast is quickly decreasing67. Traditional fishermen cannot afford to
buy cutters for deep-sea fishing. In consequence, some of them decide to
migrate to lands where the fishing grounds are not so exploited. Casamance,
where fishing constitutes a subsidiary occupation of the local people, is such a
region. Nevertheless, the settlement of more and more Wolofised Lebu people
from the North in the region arouses anxieties about the potential domination of
the “strangers,” with whom the Diola and their fellow peoples have never had
much to do. As one Senegalese interlocutor said: “it is a sick situation when a
Senegalese from Casamance nurses a grudge against a Senegalese from the
North for fishing on Casamance waters which belong to Senegal.”68
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65 Le Sénégal et la rebellion indépenantiste de Casamance, op. cit., p. 38; B.
P o s t h umu s , Senegal: An End in Sight to Casamance Violence?, European Platform
for Conflict Prevention and Transformation in Cooperation, Utrecht 1999
(http://www.conflict-prevention.net/print.php?id=57), p. 2.
66 Senegal. Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003 (http://bertelsmann-transfor-
mation-index.de/fileadmin/pdf/laendergutachten_en/frankophones_afrika/
Senegal.pdf), p. 9.
67 For more information see C. S imp s o n , Where’s the Catch?, BBC Focus on
Africa, October-December 2001, pp. 34-35.
68 Mamadou Diouf is the author of this opinion. 
The patronizing attitude of some Wolof people towards people from
the South. Some of the Wolof traditionally regard the forest people of the South
as ex definitione less civilised. Among some of the Wolof there are vivid stereo-
types describing the Diola as a people abusing alcohol and eating pork. Some
Wolof people call the Diola and their fellow people niak. This pejorative term
refers to people coming from the forest zone and it is semantically related to the
notion of “savage”. The use of this term by the Wolof evokes an inferiority com-
plex in some of the Diola, and in others it evokes a desire to rebel as they see it
as a confirmation of the discriminative attitude of the Wolof towards the small-
er peoples in the country. According to one Wolof interlocutor, the Diola are
“very honourable people who should be respected and who shouldn’t be hurt.
In Senegal, many peoples are looked down on but the Diola take it most to
heart.”69
ECONOMIC FACTORS
Underinvestment and underdevelopment of Casamance. Many inhabi-
tants of the South believe that President Senghor promised to pay special atten-
tion to the development of Casamance after Senegal gained independence. The
fact that he did not keep this promise is considered to have been an important
contributing factor to the frustrations of the region’s residents at the beginning
of the 1980s. The authorities in Dakar have been accused for years of neglect-
ing investment in, or even of entirely passing over, the southern region. Some
statistical indexes prove that before the conflict broke out Casamance really had
been neglected in many respects by the centre. For instance, in 1979 in
Casamance there were more than 32 thousand people to every doctor while the
domestic average was one doctor per 13 thousand; in the same year in
Casamance there was not a single kilometre of asphalt road, while the average
for all regions was 486 kilometres; in 1978 there was one single telephone line
per 793 people, while the average for all the rest of Senegal’s administrative
regions was one line per 132 people70.
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69 Cheik Amadou Dioum is the author of this opinion. 
70 M. Humph r e y s , H. ag Moh amed , Senegal and Mali, op. cit., p. 41.
Improvement of the quoted indexes took place in the 1980s and 1990s. See idem p. 45.
The longstanding underinvestment of the region has manifested itself espe-
cially in the government’s creating new jobs almost exclusively in Northern
Senegal. Among the decisions that were opposed by Casamance inhabitants
was, for instance, the placement of the country’s important industrial invest-
ments: for instance, a plant for cotton processing was located in Thiès near
Dakar, while cotton is cultivated mainly in Casamance (between the cities of
Kolda and Vélingara) and in the eastern region of Tambacounda. It is also
incomprehensible that the authorities in Dakar invested in rice and sugar cane
growing along the river Senegal instead of in the fertile soil of the south.
According to some sources, Casamance is potentially able to meet the food
demand of all of Senegal71. 
Lack of investment in Casamance has lead to a slowing down of develop-
ment in the South and has increased the problems of local people in connection
with the labour market. Many inhabitants of Casamance migrate for economic
reasons to Dakar (especially young girls, who work in the capital as housemaids).
The economic neglect of Casamance makes people in the region feel
ignored and abandoned by the central authorities. A part of the local elite inter-
prets the authorities’ policy as vengeance for Casamance’s traditionally strong
sense of identity. When the Senegalese from the North are asked about this
problem, they say that though it was possible that President Senghor treated
Casamance worse as an explosive and “insecure” region, President Diouf neg-
lected almost all of  Senegal and that, in fact, only greater Dakar, whose area of
less than 1% of Senegal’s surface is now inhabited by almost a quarter of the
country’s whole population, is developing72. 
The inhabitants of Casamance bear the central authorities a grudge for poor
investments in local education. For instance, at the beginning of the 1980s, i.e.,
right before the conflict broke out, there was only one secondary school whose
graduates were capable of going on to higher studies (a secondary school with
a program ending with a school leaving-exam, the baccalauréat). There was no
school of higher education either in Ziguinchor or in Kolda. Local youth who
wanted to attend a secondary school ending with a baccalauréat or a college
were sent to Saint Louis, a city situated at the border with Mauritania, that is,
over seven hundred kilometres from Ziguinchor, instead of to Dakar. In Saint
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71 Senegal. Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, London 2001, p. 22.
72 See Senegal – City Population – Cities, Towns and Provinces – Statistics and
Maps, op. cit.
Louis students lived with Wolof families, who were culturally different from
themselves. Many of Diola students eventually left school and came back to
their relatives in Casamance. The educational policy of the authorities was
regarded by the inhabitants of the South as being discriminatory, especially in a
situation where graduating from a college in the capital provided Senegalese
youth from the provinces with an opportunity to make a career in Dakar. The
inhabitants of other regions in Senegal were also dissatisfied with the underde-
velopment of their educational systems, but in their case communications with
Dakar or Saint Louis facilitated matters. 
For years the authorities in Dakar ignored the need for improving the
existing transport infrastructure in Casamance73 and for connecting the region
with the rest of Senegal. Most of the roads in the south of the country are in a
very bad condition, which makes travelling in the region difficult and time-con-
suming. Transport communication with Dakar is a top priority for inhabitants of
the South since Dakar constitutes the centre of the country’s economic and
political life. Many farmers from Casamance sell their commodities (especially
fruit, palm oil, and rice) without the participation of intermediaries. Agricultural
products are traditionally brought to the capital by women, who buy other goods
for the money they earn and take them back to Casamance. Providing better
transport conditions would certainly increase the trade initiatives of
Casamance’s inhabitants and would provide better earning conditions.  
Moreover, the main port of the region in Ziguinchor,  in the estuary of the
Casamance River, also needs investment. It is said that in order to enable larg-
er vessels to enter the port, the waterway leading to it needs to be deepened.
Modernisation of the port could potentially lead to an expansion of the process-
ing base and provide new jobs. 
For many years the easiest way for inhabitants of Casamance to reach the
capital was to travel by sea. A regular connection between Ziguinchor and
Dakar has not existed since  2002, when the only ferry that sailed between the
cities sank in the Atlantic Ocean74. Transportation by ferry guaranteed farmers
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73 Significant investments in road infrastructure of Northern Casamance were
made at the end of 1990s. See Africa. Tourism Market Trends, Madrid 2000, p. 96.
74 On September 26, 2002, the ferry Le Joola, sailing from Ziguinchor to Dakar,
overturned near the Gambia coast during stormy weather. During this sea disaster,
which is considered the most tragic in the modern African history, at least 1200 people
(some sources even mention 1800 fatalities), mostly Diola women and children, lost
their lives. The ferry Le Joola had the capacity to transport 550 passengers, but it was
of course overloaded. Particular members of the government in Dakar were made
from Casamance quite a convenient and cheap  way to carry large quantities of
fruit, which in high temperatures rot quickly. 
Travelling overland around Gambia through the city of Tambacounda takes
a long time and is unpredictable (the bad condition of roads in eastern Senegal
causes vehicles to  break down often) and the transport of agricultural goods in
this manner is not really profitable (cars are not very capacious). An alternative
solution is to travel through Gambia, but this unfortunately requires going
through the arduous border control twice. Moreover, on the way to Dakar one
needs to cross the Gambia River twice and since there is no bridge one needs to
take a - usually overloaded - ferry and pay for it. For years the Senegalese
authorities have been negotiating in vain with the authorities in Banjul to build
a bridge on the Gambia River75. Lack of progress in the negotiations is per-
ceived by some inhabitants of Casamance as Dakar’s acting to their region’s
disadvantage.  
Casamance’s elites have allegedly been lobbying for years for the building
of a turn-off to Casamance of the railway leading from Dakar to Bamako, Mali.
The line passes inter alia through the cities of Kaolack and Tambacounda, from
whence a track to Ziguinchor could potentially be constructed. However, the
authorities in Dakar regard this undertaking  as being unfeasible for lack of
financial means (most of the railway infrastructure in Senegal was constructed
back in the colonial period).
Ziguinchor and Cap Skirring in Casamance have flight connections with
Dakar but flights are becoming more and more irregular, and the tickets are too
expensive for inhabitants of the country’s southern region. 
Part of Casamance’s population being convinced that their region is
economically exploited by Senegal. Casamance is often described as the gran-
ary of Senegal since thanks to its natural conditions it is a well irrigated and fer-
tile area. Its cultivated crops include mainly rice, peanuts, maize, oil palm, var-
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responsible for this sea disaster. The families of the victims have not yet been paid their
insurance, which makes the inhabitants of Casamance feel ignored by the authorities in
Dakar. For more information see G. Ewens, The tragedy of Le Joola: Graeme Ewens
reports on the possible causes of Africa’s worst ever shipwreck and the political fallout
in Senegal, African Business, January 12, 2002.  
75 L. H a r tmann , Indigenous Rebellion in the Casamance Province of Senegal,
op. cit.
ious kinds of other trees and fruit shrubs, tuberous plants, cashews, sorghum,
and cotton. Some food products that are sold in Northern Senegal are brought
there from Casamance. When Northern Senegal is struck by drought
Casamance is the only region with a food surplus. Thanks to its access to the sea
Southern Senegal  has also developed fishing (of fish, prawns, and lobsters).  
Peanuts (and peanut oil), as well as sea resources, which come in part from
Casamance, are among Senegal’s main food export commodities76.  Raw goods
from Casamance reach the port in Dakar, which is one of the main centres of
international trade in West Africa and also a great processing centre for agricul-
tural products and fish. 
Some inhabitants of Casamance complain that raw products coming from
their region are purchased at low prices in the capital city, where they are
processed and sold abroad at higher prices. This system of the circulation, pro-
cessing, and export of products is typical of almost the whole economy of the
country. However, as one Senegalese interlocutor admits: “This phenomenon
can be perceived as the exploitation of the Casamance region by Senegal if one
lives in the south”77. At the same time it should be mentioned that in Ziguinchor
there are small food-processing plants for peanuts, fishes, and oranges. 
Foreign tourism to Casamance has been developing for years78. The
region’s beaches, which are amongst the most beautiful in Africa, attract foreign
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76 It should be stressed that the most of the peanuts come from the North of
Senegal.
77 Mamadou Diouf is the author of this view. 
78 The Senegalese authorities are stimulating the development of foreign holiday
tourism (especially in the tourist resort of Cap Skirring on the Atlantic coast near
Kabrousse at the Guinea Bissau border) and they are also trying to persuade European
nature enthousiasts to visit Basse Casamance National Park near the estuary of the
Casamance River and they are trying to develop so-called ‘alternative tourism.’ An
opportunity to stay overnight in Diola villages in the campements (campements ruraux
integrés) i.e., original (or stylised) huts forming a traditional living complex, is a great
attraction for tourists visiting the region. An advantage of visiting such a village is being
able to commune with people who still cherish ancient traditions and to take a closer
look at their culture. Nevertheless, a characteristic feature of tourist activity in the inte-
rior is still the lack of mass tourism. In previous decades the construction of campe-
ments managed by a village cooperative movement in Casamance was possible thanks
to government loans. Income from tourism was invested in construction of schools and
in medical infrastructure. The development of alternative tourism allowed the quality of
life to be improved in some villages in Casamance without the excessive threat of the
side effects that are connected with mass tourism.
tourists (especially from France and Italy) and investors. The Atlantic coast of
Casamance probably has the largest (right after Gambia) concentration of
tourist infrastructure in continental West Africa79. However, tourism does not
contribute in any notable way to improving the quality of life of most of the
inhabitants of the region. In Cap Skirring on the Atlantic Ocean, where most of
Casamance’s hotels were built, local people complain that they do not even
have permanent access to running water, and tourism concerns like Club Méd
do not contribute to alleviating their problems80. A significant number of the
people employed - especially in managerial positions - in the hotel industry and
other tourist branches come from the North, if only because private tour opera-
tors who act as go-betweens in organising tourist transport to Casamance have
their seats in Dakar. Most income from tourism is transferred abroad, goes into
the central budget, or to tourist entrepreneurs in the capital city. Local elites
describe this state of affairs as neo-colonialism in tourism, while the authorities
in Dakar call it the rules of the market. 
Another area for the dissatisfaction of the region’s inhabitants is the issue
of oil exploitation. The local elites believe that on the Casamance shelf there are
very rich resources for oil production, but that this production was for many
years maliciously forbidden by the Senegalese authorities. Dakar maintained
earlier that the economic viability of oil production  in the area is not entirely
certain and that it is hard to find investors willing to embark on this venture. It
seems that this problem has recently been solved since the demand for black
gold is dynamically increasing and the prices are going up.81 The authorities
have recently negotiated a contract for producing oil with a Malaysian concern
and they are holding talks with investors from other countries. However, this is
not the end of the problem – the region’s elites consider that there is now an
opportunity to build a local oil refinery in Casamance, while the government of
Senegal considers this to be an economically unprofitable idea since there is
already one refinery in Dakar. In consequence, some inhabitants of Casamance
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79 A. N ew t o n , D. E l s e , West Africa, Hawthorn 1995, p. 811. 
80 For more information see C. S i p s o n , Senegal: Tourism blues as hotels operate
below capacity, February 3, 2003 (http://www.warmafrica.com/index/geo/4/cat/2/
a/a/artid/168). 
81 Perhaps the issue of a recent discovery of significant oil resources on the
Gambia shelf is not at that point insignificant. For more information see M. K a n t e , Oil
at last, New African, May 2004, p. 25. 
fear that oil production may become not so much the mainspring of the local
economy as a curse for the region82. 
POLITICAL FACTORS
The central authorities’ attempts to weaken the local culture through
the so-called policy of assimilation. The cultural specificity of Casamance was
already quite visible in the period when the territory of today’s Senegal was a
part of French West Africa. In independent Senegal, however, it became the
cause of a serious rift between the policy of the authorities in Dakar and the
needs of the region’s population. Both the first president of the republic,
Léopold Senghor (who governed the state in the years 1960-1980)83 and his
successor Abdou Diouf (head of the state in the years 1981-2000) continued the
French policy of minimizing ethnic and cultural differences between peoples. In
the colonial era, the French hoped they would be able to unite the various eth-
nic groups of Senegal through the French language and culture. The policy of
Senghor (a Catholic from the Serer people) and Diouf (a Muslim from the
Wolof people) consisted rather in an attempt to assimilate smaller peoples into
the Wolof84. This policy succeeded especially at the linguistic level.  
However, the Diola do not like the idea of the Wolofisation (or
Senegalisation à la Wolof), which they understand as imposing the culture of the
predominant people on the smaller peoples of the country. The Diola do not
want their children who attend schools in Casamance to find plenty of informa-
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82 There arises an analogy to another region in Africa with strong separatist prob-
lems, namely to Kabinda where most of Angolan oil is produced but not processed and
natural wealth does not contribute significantly to increasing the quality of the local
population’s life.  For more information see L. P aw s o n , Fields of Dreams, BBC Focus
on Africa, April-June 2001, pp. 32-34. 
83 For more information on nation formation processes in Senegal in Senghor’s
time see Z. Komo r ow s k i , Senegal – kszta≥towanie siÍ jednoúci i niepodleg≥oúci, op.
cit., esp. p. 10. 
84 The French colonial administration cooperated in ruling the territory of today’s
Senegal with marabouts who have been linked with agricultural economy. Although
Senegal, ever since it gained independence, has been a secular state by definition, the
authorities in Dakar have also been cooperating with Muslim leaders. The process of
state formation in Senegal has always required the strong support of Muslim Wolof
leaders.
tion in their textbooks on the history of the Wolof and of Northern Senegal and
just a few lines on the history of Casamance and its people. Moreover, the Diola
do not agree to having their local traditions ignored. In Senegal, men of letters
and writers from Casamance are not known or revered, nor are those southern
heroes who fought against the French colonialism known. The local people like
to remind one that Casamance was the last bastion to capitulate to the French
during the colonisation of the lands included in today’s Senegal. Meanwhile,
school textbooks talk almost exclusively of heroes from the north. An episode
that has stuck in the memory of the South’s inhabitants was the inauguration of
the football stadium in Ziguinchor  - the authorities did not respect the wishes
of the people to name it after one of their local heroes.
The authorities in Dakar explain that their policy is not turned against the
Diola and it only aims to strengthen the consciousness amongst the Senegalese
of belonging to a nation state that allegedly functions above ethnic differences.
Elaborate symbolism (portraits of leaders, flags, emblems, and national slogans)
and, above all, the modern school, in which individual local cultures are to
intermingle and change, are supposed to help propagate the idea of a single
common state of various peoples. Such a manner of interpreting the assimila-
tion policy is supposed to lead to the elimination of regional identities and to
prevent the arousal of the antagonisms that used to separate particular ethnic
groups. Yet the weakening of local cultures for the benefit of the dominant one
disturbs age-old traditions and customs and may in consequence bring about an
effect opposite to that intended by the authorities. Casamance is here a clear
example.  
The domination of peoples originating from Northern Senegal in the
country’s political life. Ever since the country gained independence the major-
ity of the political elites of Senegal have descended from the Wolof.
Traditionally rich families from Dakar have enormous influence on the political
and military establishment. A southerner has never become Senegal’s prime
minister and a member of the Diola has never been nominated a general in the
Senegalese army. However, moderate politicians from Casamance have several
times occupied important ministerial positions in the government. Southerners
have sat in the Senegalese parliament. However, their participation in political
life did not entail representing the population of the South and was exclusively
connected with their membership in the Socialist Party, which until 2000 gov-
erned the country and which had a de facto monopoly on power. In conse-
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quence, the interests of the southern part of Senegal could not be adequately
voiced in Dakar.  
It is, however, possible that before MFDC was reactivated the
Casamance elites were not united enough to fight effectively for the interests of
the South. The South’s traditional lack of a political hierarchy (or a political and
religious one) common to the whole region remains in contrast to the situation
in the North, where various Muslim brotherhoods governed by marabouts are
very influential, especially among the Wolof, Toucouleur and Serer.85 These
people are governed by the traditional rule of ndigel – the followers do what the
marabouts say. The power of the marabouts forms something of a state within a
state.86 The authority of the marabouts from the largest brotherhoods does not,
however, reach the Casamance population, and the marabouts are not able to
contribute effectively to solving the problems of Southern Senegal.87
Not admitting local elites to administrative posts in Casamance. The
most unfair and frustrating issue for the educated elites of Casamance was,
however, the so-called internal colonialism,88 i.e., the Dakar authorities’ long-
standing filling of the region’s administrative posts (especially the posts of gov-
ernors and prefects) with civil servants who descended from peoples other than
from the Diola who are the majority there. During the colonial period, the
Casamance population was governed by local elites, which were subordinate to
the colonizers. In independent Senegal, the posts of governors in the South have
been occupied mainly by the Wolof. There has never been, for instance, a Diola
who became a governor of one of the provinces in the North. Before the con-
flict in Casamance broke out mayors in that region were often from the Wolof
people– they were not acquainted with problems of the local communities and,
since they were strangers, they were not accepted by the local people. At the
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85 The biggest brotherhoods of the Wolof are Murids from Tuba and Tijaniya from
Tiwauan. 
86 On influence of marabouts before the arrival of the Portuguese to West Africa
see M. Tymowsk i , Sudan Zachodni od VII do XVI w. (West Sudan from 7th to 16th
Century), op. cit., p. 483. 
87 In the south of Senegal there are brotherhoods with hardly any influence like
Hajdara and Fadelina.  
88 P. B o n i f a c e , Atlas wojen XX wieku. Konflikty wspó≥czesne i w przysz≥oúci
(The Atlas of 20th Century Wars. Contemporary and Future Conflicts), Warszawa 2001,
p. 130. 
same time, the Diola never occupied similar posts in Northern Senegal. The sit-
uation in Casamance did not change until an escalation of military actions. The
authorities in Dakar started filling administrative posts in the region with local
but moderate politicians who officially did not sympathise with MFDC. 
The mistakes that the authorities in Dakar made expose the weakness of the
Senegalese system of governance. For if true democracy had been developing
in Senegal at the time of Senghor’s and Diouf’s presidencies, then power would
probably have been more decentralized and the Casamance elites would have
had access to posts in the local administration. At the same time, it is a charac-
teristic feature that in regions where the Wolof do not constitute the majority,
local elites traditionally govern the local people. Not admitting the local elites
to power in Casamance for many years was probably due to the fact that Dakar
was afraid that they would become too active politically. 
The personality and descent of Senegal leaders and their style of exer-
cising power. Military separatism in Casamance emerged after Léopold
Senghor ceased being the president of Senegal (1980). This famous politician
with the soul of a poet, a co-originator of the concept of négritude, was held in
high esteem in almost all of Senegal and other countries in Africa and the world.
Diplomatic refinement and an ability to ease political misunderstandings were
very characteristic of Senghor. He was descended from the Serer people who
are related to the Diola by traditional bonds of brotherhood (called parenté à
plaisanterie). Although during Senghor’s governance, many decisions were
made that became unpopular with the inhabitants of Southern Senegal, the
Diola accepted the first president. In 1981, the office of president was assumed
by Abdou Diouf of the Wolof, who, it is believed, intensified the so-called
assimilation policy, and, in comparison to Senghor, proved to be a much less
astute politician in both internal and external politics. The brutal and bloody
reaction of Diouf’s security forces to a peaceful demonstration in Ziguinchor in
December 1982 became flshpoint of the armed conflict in Casamance a year
later. 
President Diouf’s foreign policy resulted in an increase of antagonisms in
contacts with neighbouring countries, which in consequence did not hamper the
attempts of their citizens to support the separatists in Casamance. As far as
internal policy is concerned. For a long time President Diouf made sure election
results did not allow Abdoulaye Wade, a candidate of the opposition Democratic
Party who had a conciliatory attitude towards the MFDC, who was  popular in
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the country, and who was respected by many inhabitants of Casamance, to come
to power.89
The resumption of activity by the MFDC as the institutionalisation of
the opposition of some of the elites and of the Casamance population to the
policies of the Senegalese authorities. Father Diamacouné, who descends
from the Diola, taught for years about the cultural specificity of the Diola and
other peoples in Casamance. This charismatic parish priest started to have con-
siderable standing and to enjoy popularity among the local people and effective-
ly filled the vaccum in local leadership. In 1982, Diamacouné reactivated the
MFDC. The resumption of MFDC activity was a kind of institutionalisation of
the opposition of part of the region’s population and elites to the actions (or ces-
sation thereof) of the central authorities in Casamance. The MFDC relied on the
frustrations which had grown through the years. The movement became an
exponent of the needs of some of the inhabitants of the region and at the same
time provided the missing element for a potential armed conflict to break out.
When the MFDC was reactivated a part of the Casamance population finally
had a body to represent its interests and a defined centre of opposition against
the policies of the central authorities. 
The disintegration of the Casamance region into smaller administra-
tive units. A part of Casamance’s inhabitants maintains that traditionally the
name Casamance was used to refer to the whole south-eastern part of Senegal.
Greater Casamance is said to reach the Falémé River at the border with today’s
Mali in the east and Tambacounda in the north (i.e., much farther than where the
springs of the Casamance River or the Senegalese stretch of the Gambia River
are located). In 1960, the Senegalese authorities established two new adminis-
trative regions in the south and in the east of the country: Casamance and
Oriental. In 1984 Casamance was divided into two smaller regions: Ziguinchor
in the west and Kolda in the east. The population of the South thinks that the
changes introduced in the administrative division aimed mainly at an artificial
division of the historical region of Casamance and at wiping its name off the
map.    
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89 See e.g. Senegal. Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2003, op. cit., p. 2.
The existence of models of late statehood in the vicinity of Casamance
and on the African continent.When Senegal was gaining independence from
France in 1960, the processes of state formation in the neighborhood of
Casamance had not yet been completed. The little country of Gambia became
an independent state in 1965, but the British monarchy ceased to fulfil the func-
tion of head of the state there only 5 years later. Portuguese Guinea, neighbour-
ing with Casamance, became independent Guinea Bissau only in 1973, while
another Portuguese colony in West Africa – the Cape Verde Islands – did not
gain independence as the Republic of Cape Verde until 1975. Similarly, other
Portuguese colonies in Africa – Mozambique and Angola, as well as Sao Tome
and the Principe Islands – gained independence relatively late. The process of
state formation in Africa has not yet completed. In the 1990s, an independent
Namibia emerged and, as a result of secession, Eritrea. In the case of some
African territories, decolonisation has not yet been completed. Instances of late
decolonisation or secessions in Africa could undoubtedly have worked on the
imagination of separatists in Southern Senegal. The existence in Casamance’s
vicinity of an experimental union of a confederate nature, i.e., Senegambia,
which was established in 1982, could also have stimulated the hopes of sepa-
ratists for future change in their region’s status. 
Supporting separatism in Casamance by external forces. The MFDC
was supported by external forces to a limited degree. This help probably did not
contribute to  the eruption of armed separatism in the region and was provided
rather periodically once the conflict had already started. It is characteristic that
the deterioration of the conflict in Casamance took place during the civil war in
Guinea Bissau and when Senegal’s relations with Mauritania and Guinea Bissau
had started to become tense. 
For almost the whole period of the conflict the Diola could count on a safe
shelter among their fellow peoples in Gambia, and especially on the help of the
Diola inhabiting Guinea Bissau, whom they had once supported in their fight
against the Portuguese (the conflict in Casamance broke out 10 years after the
founding of independent Guinea Bissau). In May 1990, when the intensity of
fighting in Casamance was very high, the pursuit of MFDC members by
Senegalese soldiers onto the territory of Guinea Bissau nearly led to war
between the two countries. 
Certainly, an important factor in the evolution of the conflict in Casamance
was the long standing border conflict between Senegal and Guinea Bissau, con-
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cerning the boundaries of territorial waters (fishing) and the continental shelf
(oil resources), which was finally solved in 1991 by the International Court of
Justice in Hague in favour of Senegal. Seeking support for their fight with
armed separatism in Casamance, the authorities in Dakar traditionally tried to
maintain good relations with the authorities in Bissau. However, General João
Bernardo (“Niño”) Vieira, who governed Guinea Bissau from 1980, for many
years acquiesced to some army officers’ acting as a go-betweens in arms deliv-
eries to the MFDC, which probably in part resulted from the complicated polit-
ical situation in Guinea Bissau. Officially, Vieria maintained good relations with
Dakar. The authorities of Guinea Bissau even signed an agreement with Senegal
about non-aggression and mutual aid in case of an attempt to overthrow the
authorities of one of the signatory states by force. When a war broke out in in
Guinea Bissau in June 1998 after the coup d’état instigated by Brigadier
Ansumane Mane, the authorities in Dakar sent intervention troops to assist their
neighbour. At the same time, units faithful to Brigadier Mane were supported by
separatists from Casamance, who consequently received a considerable quanti-
ty of arms. Finally, in June 1999, Mane came to power in Bissau. The new junta
supported the separatists from Casamance to a degree that allowed the latter to
fire effectively at military installations in Southern Senegal. However, Kumba
Yalla (Ialá), the new president of Guinea Bissau who came to power in January
2000, dissociated himself from helping the MFDC. Yalla stopped tolerating the
presence of separatists within Guinea Bissau as he wanted his country to have
good relations with its better developed and richer neighbour,  and he wanted to
sort out the political problems on his own territory.
In the 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s, information about indirect
Libyan90 and Mauritanian91 support for the MFDC, which consisted in financ-
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90 See M. Ku c z y Ò s k i , Konflikty zbrojne na úwiecie: Afryka (Armed Conflicts in
the World: Africa), Warszawa 1995, p. 80 and generally on Libyan participation in spon-
soring African conflicts idem, p. 5. Cf. M. E v a n s , Senegal: Mouvement des Forces
Démocratiques de la Casamance (MFDC), op. cit., p. 8.
91 In 1989 a border incident between Senegal and Mauritania took place. It result-
ed in riots and numerous acts of violence in both countries. The direct cause of the dis-
pute was the killing of two Senegalese herdsmen by Mauritanian border guards – they
were said to have illegally crossed the border while grazing cattle. The Dakar people
reacted to this incident by raiding Mauritanian shops and killing their owners. The
authorities in Nouakchott responded by detaining and expelling Senegalese citizens
from Mauritanian territory. The authorities in Senegal acted similarly. In both countries
ing or facilitating arms deliveries were nothing unusual. Mauritanian intermedi-
aries living in Gambia92 (in 1989, as a result of misunderstandings between the
authorities of Gambia and Senegal, the confederation disintegrated) allegedly
played an important role in this. 
FINAL REMARKS
In conclusion, it is worthwhile to make an attempt at an axiological classi-
fication of the factors involved in the conflict, i.e., to assign the historical,
ethno-cultural, geographic and environmental, social, economic, and political
factors to groups that defined their significance for the outbreak and evolution
of armed separatism in Casamance. In adopting this approach, I divided the
above factors into favourable, influential and determinant. In my opinion,
favourable factors include objective factors which constituted very basic con-
ditions for (“the basis”) and produced an appropriate environment for the con-
flict. They lay at the origin or facilitated the evolution of armed separatism.
Influential factors are ones that constituted a pre-condition for the emergence
or intensification of cleavages – factors that significantly contributed to the out-
break and/or evolution of the conflict. Determininant factors are the ones that
gave the impulse for the outbreak or violent evolution of the conflict 
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hundreds of people died. A tragedy on a greater scale was avoided thanks to an air
bridge organised by the international community which served to “exchange” residents
coming from both countries. In consequence of the conflict the border between Senegal
and Mauritania was closed and diplomatic relations were broken off (they were restored
in 1992). Cf. B. P o s t h umu s , Senegal: An End in Sight to Casamance Violence?, op.
cit., p. 4. Contemporary animosities between the Senegalese and Mauritanian people are
hundreds of years old and are connected with the black slave trade practiced by the
Moors. The Berber-Arabian people who predominate in present day Mauritania (over
80% of the country’s residents) still stress their superiority over the native Black peo-
ples (which include the peoples living on the Mauritanian side of the Senegal River,
such as the Wolof, Toucouleur, Fulani, and Soninke people) which intensifies the inter-
nal conflicts in Mauritania, where slavery is still practiced.  
92 On the use of territories of West African states in the illegal arms trade see K.
Tr z c iÒ s k i , Wojny w Liberii i Sierra Leone (1989-2002). Geneza, przebieg i nastÍpst-
wa (Wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone [1989-2002] Origins, development and conse-
quences), Warszawa 2002, pp. 105-106.
I have also classified factors in accordance with the criterion of their sig-
nificance for the origin and significance for the evolution of the conflict in
Casamance. Some of the factors discussed in the study refer only to the origin
and others only to the evolution of the armed separatist conflict in Casamance.
There is also a group of factors that contributed to both the origin and the evo-
lution of the conflict.
Both classifications are presented in the table below:
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An axiological classification of factors connected with the conflict in
Casamance according to the criterion of their significance for the origin and/or
evolution of armed separatism in Casamance. 
***
The factors that above all contributed to the initiation of the peace process
in Casamance include: the election of a the new president in Senegal (in 2000
Abdou Diouf was finally replaced by Abdoulaye Wade), the exhaustion of
MFDC leaders and fighters with a long-lasting combat, the hardship caused to
the region’s population by the conflict, and the decrease of the separatists’ oper-
ational capacities resulting from the liquidation of their bases within the territo-
ry of Guinea Bissau.  In spite of all the victims and the damages, the conflict
has brought some changes for the better: for some years now the central author-
ities have been investing in developing the infrastructure in Casamance; more
and more posts in the local administration are filled with local people; and the
Diola, thanks to having fought for their own interests, are today more respected
by the Wolof93. 
The real and declared aims of MFDC separatists still need to be examined
separately and in detail. They probably differed at various periods of the con-
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93 This opinion is a result of talks that the author had with the Senegalese Wolof. 
flict and in various circles of the leadership. The most important aims included:
the region’s gaining independence or territorial autonomy, with separate politi-
cal institutions; negotiating better terms for the region’s development and its
economic integration with Senegal; preservation of the cultural identity of the
local people; and the gaining  of power and the financial benefits connected
with it by the region’s elites. Among separatists there were also people for
whom the conflict became, at some point, a way of life. And a small group of
visionaries in the MFDC ranks adhered to the irredentist idea of reactivating the
historical state of Gabu on the territory of Casamance, Gambia, and Guinea
Bissau.
The conflict in Casamance began in a different era than today’s. In today’s
times, the MFDC can be transformed into a legal political party and can win local
elections. There is a small chance that the south will gain autonomy, with its own
government, parliament, and partly different legal system, or that the post of
vice-president of Senegal will be established for a representative of Casamance.
But if the authorities in Dakar were to grant autonomy to Casamance, other peo-
ples inhabiting other provinces could want to receive it as well, on the basis, for
instance, of their ethnicity. And this could threaten the territorial integrity of the
country. Casamance undoubtedly needs new investments – for the reconstruction
and building of roads, hospitals, processing plants, schools, and a university. It is
probable that creating a duty-free zone there would contribute to the develop-
ment of the region. Moreover, the central authorities’ greater respect for the
region’s cultural specificity is certainly indispensable. 
Negotiations concerning the final terms of the peace in Casamance will
probably not be concluded before the end of 2006. The international communi-
ty is to help in reconstructing the region94. In order to secure permanent peace
in Casamance it would be worthwhile to refer to European experience where
developing peripheral regions and policies towards ethnic minorities are con-
cerned. An acquaintance with and understanding of the factors that contributed
to the outbreak and evolution of the conflict are an indispensable foundation for
elaborating the right strategy to prevent a new outbreak of armed separatism in
Southern Senegal and to finally solve the conflict.
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94 The World Bank has already prepared the so called Senegal – Casamance
Emergency Reconstruction Support Project. See Senegal Receives US$20 Million for
Emergency Recovery Project in Casamance, World Bank Press Release (Washington
DC), September 9, 2004. 
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